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An Analysis of the Georgia "Live-In Lover"
Law
In 1977, the Georgia legislature amended the law concerning the modification of alimony judgments and awards.' In its amendment, the general
assembly included what has come to be known as the "live-in lover" law.
The "live-in lover" law gave courts the power to modify awards of alimony and support on petition of the husband. By statute, it was required
that the husband show in his petition that the former wife was openly
and continuously in voluntary cohabitation with another man.'
The first challenge to the new law questioned its constitutionality. In
Sims v. Sims,' the Georgia Supreme Court, following the United States
Supreme Court decision in Orr v. Orr,4 held that the "live-in lover" law
was unconstitutional because it permitted modification only when the
wife voluntarily cohabited with another man. To remedy the constitutional infirmity, the "live-in lover" law was amended in 1979 when the
legislature attempted to bring all Georgia divorce and alimony law into
compliance with the Orr decision.' The new amendments made all Georgia domestic laws gender neutral. The Orr amendments also changed the
"live-in lover" law by redefining cohabitation. After 1979, cohabitation
was defined as "dwelling together continuously and openly in a meretricious relationship with a person of the opposite sex."6
Since the substance of the new provision has yet to be judicially tested,
it will be the purpose of this comment to discuss exactly how the "live-in
1.
2.

1977 Ga. Laws 1253, 1254, (current version at GA. CODE ANN. § 30-220 (Supp. 1980)).
The actual "live-in lover" provision stated:
Subsequent to a final judgment of divorce awarding periodic payment of alimony
for the support of the wife, the voluntary cohabitation of the former wife with a
man shall also be grounds to modify provisions made for periodic payments of
permanent alimony for the support of the former wife. As used herein, the word
cohabitation shall mean dwelling together continuously and openly. In the event
the petitioner does not prevail in his petition for modification on the ground as set
forth herein, he shall be liable for reasonable attorneys fees incurred by the respondent for the defense of said action.
Id. at 1255.
3. 243 Ga. 275, 253 S.E.2d 761 (1979).
4. 440 U.S. 268 (1979).
5. GA. CODE ANN. § 30-220(b) (Supp. 1980) (originally enacted as 1979 Ga. Laws 466,
482).
6. Id.
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lover" law changed existing law, to focus on the policy which prompted
its existence, and to determine what proof is required to make a sufficient
showing for modification under its provisions.

I.

THE CHANGE AFFECTED IN EXISTING LAW

Upon enactment, the Georgia "live-in lover" law became a part of a
series of statutes which authorize the cessation or modification of alimony
awards given the occurrence of certain specified events. Given the existence of a permanent award, 7 the Code expressly stated the ways in which
payments would cease or be subject to modification. Georgia Code Ann.
section 30-2098 sanctioned the cessation of alimony payments upon the
wife's remarriage unless otherwise provided in the actual divorce decree.
Also, Georgia Code Ann. section 30-217 s provided that the obligation and
the award itself would be annulled should the husband and wife voluntarily decide to live together again. It is important to note that between the
parties themselves, section 30-217 did not and does not now require actual remarriage for the obligation to cease. Subsequent cohabitation by
the parties themselves affects only the wife's alimony award and leaves
the child support obligation totally undisturbed. 10 Cohabitation in section
30-217 was undefined by either the legislature or the judiciary.
Apart from these provisions, Georgia Code Ann. section 30-22011 allowed the husband or wife to petition the court for a revision and modification of the permanent alimony award. Stating specifically the grounds
on which a petition for modification could be heard and decided, section
30-220 only allowed modification based on changes in the "income and
financial status of the husband."' 2 The judge was given discretionary
power to modify and revise the award if a change in the income or
financial status of the husband were satisfactorily proven. Evidence concerning the former wife's income and financial status was relevant and
could be considered on a petition for modification. Thus, prior to the Orr
decision in 1979, several events could result in the cessation or modification of an alimony award. The wife could remarry, or the former husband
7. The pre-1977 provisions of the Georgia code provided that alimony could be awarded
in three cases: divorce, voluntary separation, and where the wife was abandoned or driven
off by her husband against her will. GA. CODE ANN. § 30-210 (1969) (current version at GA.
CODE ANN. § 30-210 (Supp. 1980)).
8. GA. CODE ANN. § 30-209 (1969) (current version at GA. CODE ANN. § 30-209 (Supp.
1980)).
9. GA. CODE ANN. § 30-217 (1969).
10. Id.
11. GA. CODE ANN. § 30-220 (1969) (current version at GA. CODE ANN. § 30-220 (Supp.
1980)).
12. Id.
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and wife could cohabit with actual remarriage not being a prerequisite to
cessation. However, concerning modification based on changed financial
condition, the wife was given the clear benefit of legislative policy. The
only real consideration in a petition for modification was the change that
had occurred in the husband's financial status since the date of the alimony award.
After the Orr decision, the cessation and modification provisions of the
Code remained. However, the legislature, in accordance with the Supreme
Court directive, acted to make all Georgia domestic laws gender neutral.
Beyond this change, the provisions of the law remained constant. The
most striking effect of the Orr changes was seen in the operation of section 30-220.'1 After the Orr amendment, it was possible for either party to
seek modification based on a change in the financial status of the other
party." For the husband, this meant that he could now bring a petition
for modification based on his former wife's increase in financial condition.
Georgia Code Ann. section 30-22115 also affected petitions for modification. Section 30-221 specifically limited the court's consideration on review of a petition for modification to whether there had been a substantial change in the income or financial status of the husband to warrant
revision. Given this priority, the merits of whether the wife was entitled
to increased or decreased support could not be considered. 6 After Orr,
section 30-221 remained unchanged except for the fact that the focus of
consideration on a petition for modification was the "change in the in7
come or financial status of the party liable for alimony.'
To ask how the "live-in lover" law changed Georgia domestic law is
really to question the necessity of the amendment. In essence, this question asks: Does the "live-in lover" statute deal with any action or relationship not covered in the previous sections of the Code? The effect of
the "live-in lover" law in 1980 is different from its original impact in 1977
because of legislative amendments to other provisions of Georgia domestic law. Because of these recent amendments, it is important to distinguish the effect of the "live-in lover" law on the law as it existed in 1977
with its effect on the law today.
If a former spouse cohabited with a member of the opposite sex in an

13. Although the enactment of Ga. Code Ann. § 30-220(a) preceded the Orr amendments
by two years, the purposes behind both changes are the same. Both enactments sought to
make Georgia domestic laws gender neutral. Therefore, given the proximity of time between
the enactments, it is not inappropriate to call the 1977 amendment an Orr amendment.
14. GA. CODE ANN. § 30-220(a) (Supp. 1980).
15. GA. CODE ANN. § 30-221 (1969) (current version at GA. CODE ANN. § 30-221 (Supp.
1980)).
16. Id.
17. GA. CODE ANN. § 30-221 (Supp. 1980).
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"open, continuous, or meretricious relationship," such a situation could
be analogized to the relationship of common law marriage.1 8 Reading
marriage broadly in section 30-209, the existence of any relationship approaching or resembling a marital union could end alimony obligations.
Common law marriage could carry with it the same moral obligation as a
regular marriage, without the legal significance and recognition. The focus
would have to be on the intent of the parties: Did the participants in the
relationship expect the benefits and assume the obligations of a legal
marriage? 1' Did the former spouse represent the new relationship to the
world as a new marital union? 0 By focusing on the intent of the parties,
the substance of the new relationship must be examined and scrutinized.
The technicality of the marriage certificate and legal ceremony is no
longer the distinguishing characteristic of "marriage." Thus, under both
the old law and present law, a petitioning husband could claim that the
new relationship of his former wife was in effect remarriage. If the court
21
agreed, the alimony obligations would automatically cease.
Under the law after the 1977 amendment of section 30-220(a), the
spouse-petitioner could seek modification by showing a change in the income or financial status of the other party. By taking this approach under
present law, the petitioner for modification would assert a claim that the
new relationship of the former spouse has created a change in his or her
financial circumstance. Because of the new relationship, the former
spouse is better off financially. The former spouse would be receiving
double support if the support payments ordered under the decree of divorce continue during the time of subsequent cohabitation. Since the
spouse now receives the same support previously only received from the
divorce award, the need for alimony is decreased. Therefore, the decreased need operates as a basis for revision.
It is important to remember that this analysis does not depend on the
content of the new relationship. Even if the parties have not committed
themselves to a relationship similar to marriage, their situation does imply a contract.22 The woman is providing the home for the paramour
while the paramour is financially supporting the former wife. This relationship changes the wife's financial status and income as much as a meretricious relationship in which the parties have made personal, binding

18.

See Askew v. Dupree, 30 Ga. 173 (1860); See also Editorial Note following GA. CODE

ANN. § 53-101 (1974).

19. Id.
20. Heflinger v. Heflinger, 161 Ga. 867, 132 S.E. 85 (1926); White v. White, 41 Ga. App.
394, 153 S.E. 203 (1930).
21. GA. CODE ANN. § 30-209 (Supp. 1980).
22. See discussion and cases noted in Editorial Note following GA. CODE ANN. § 53-101
(1974). See also GA. CODE ANN. § 53-104 (1974); GA. CODE ANN. § 53-107 (1974).
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commitments.
It might then appear that the "live-in lover" statute was a mere appendage to the existing law and that judicial interpretation of existing statutes could have covered anything found in the "live-in lover" law. However, this view is incorrect when the law prior to the "live-in lover" law
enactment is considered. Consequently, to achieve the objective which the
legislature sought-ending alimony to a woman who cohabits openly,
continuously, and meretriciously with another man-the "live-in lover"
statute was required. There are two reasons for the necessity of this particular legislative act: the existing law at the time of the "live-in lover"
enactment and its judicial interpretation.
At the time the "live-in lover" law was enacted, the object of the legislation was not already covered in the law. The "live-in lover" law was
passed in 1977. The law in Georgia focused only on the changed financial
status or income of the former husband. Section 30-220(a) allowed consideration of the former wife's change in income and financial status only
as relevant evidence in consideration of whether the husband's payments
should be increased or decreased. Similarly, reading sections 30-220 and
30-221 together, the merits of the former wife's claim or need could not
be considered." As a result, prior to 1977 the husband who wished to
assert a change in the wife's financial status by virtue of her open, meretricious, and continuous relationship with another man would have been
unsuccessful because of two points. The merits of the wife's need which
could encompass consideration of her new relationship were not deemed
to be in issue and were consequently immaterial, and the real issue and
focus of the court's consideration was whether the husband's income and
financial status had changed substantially so as to mandate a revision upward or downward. Thus, prior to the "live-in lover" enactment, the husband had no real course of attack when arguing that a change in the
wife's financial status occurred by virtue of her relationship with another
man. If the wife did participate in such a relationship, the husband was
forced to continue to pay the court-awarded alimony.
The "live-in lover" law gave the husband a method of attack. However,
the method created was based not on the financial nature of the relationship but instead on its substantive content. In a roundabout way, since
this new relationship really changed the wife's financial status, the husband had the opportunity to relieve his alimony burden.
Prior to 1977, judicial decisions were not favorable to petitions from
former husbands seeking a revision of the alimony award based on ex23. GA. CODE ANN. § 30-220 (1969) (current version at GA. CODE ANN. § 30-220 (Supp.
1980)); GA. CODE ANN. § 30-221 (1969) (current version at GA. CODE ANN. § 30-221 (Supp.
1980)).
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isting statutes. Section 30-209 was given strict judicial interpretation
based on the legal significance of the word "marriage". 24 "Marriage" in
and of itself has specific legal connotations which make it very hard to
equate it with a "continuous, open, and meretricious relationship."
Consequently, Georgia courts were very reluctant to equate such a relationship with marriage. In McBrayer v. McBrayer,5 the Georgia Supreme
Court addressed the petitioner's argument that his former wife's relationship constituted remarriage. The evidence presented was that the paramour visited constantly at the former wife's apartment for several years
and that the couple had taken several trips to distant cities over the
course of their relationship. The court in McBrayer declined to equate
this relationship with marriage. The court noted that there was no evidence that the couple held themselves out as man and wife or that they
had cohabited together. Likewise, there was no direct evidence of an
agreement, or of an agreement consummated by cohabitation. Ultimately
the husband's petition was denied.
This argument has also been asserted in a California case. California
has a statute similar to Georgia's "live-in lover" law. 6 However, in In re
7
Marriage of Harris,3
the issue arose in the context of a separation agreement. In the separation agreement, the husband promised to pay the wife
alimony until her remarriage or death. When the former wife began to
live with another man followng the divorce, the husband's only choice was
to maintain an action for modification based on the contention that the
new relationship constituted marriage. The court declined to equate the
relationship with marriage and focused on the expectation of the parties
when entering the separation agreement. In essence, the court held that
"marriage" is a term of art with special meaning and significance. Thus, a
relationship which could be sufficiently proven to be open, continuous,
and meretricious so as to bring a "live-in lover" law into action was not
sufficient to constitute marriage. 8
While the courts' reluctance to equate an open, continuous, and meretricious relationship with marriage seems harsh on petitioners such as
McBrayer and Harris,the result is supported by policy. Most state statutes provide for the automatic cessation of all alimony given the event of
remarriage. Should the court find that remarriage has occurred, it has no
choice but to end all alimony payments. Since the ultimate result if marriage is found is extremely harsh on the party in the new relationship, it
24
554, 6
25.
26.
27.
28.

See Peacock v. Peacock, 196 Ga. 441, 26 S.E.2d 608 (1943); Lehkoff v. Sicro, 189 Ga.
S.E.2d 687 (1939).
227 Ga. 224, 179 S.E.2d 772 (1971).
CAL. CIv. CODE §§ 4801 to 4801.5 (West Supp. 1980).
65 Cal. App. 3d 143, 134 Cal. Rptr. 890 (Ct. App. 1976).
Id.
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would seem proper that the petitioner seeking cessation and claiming that
remarriage has occurred meet a stringent burden as well.
Apart from remarriage, the Georgia courts, prior to 1977, also took a
stern interpretation of petitions brought under section 30-220(a). According to section 30-220, a trial court's power to modify alimony awards is
discretionary.2 9 Even if the petitioning husband could show a substantial
change in the wife's income or financial status, the court may or may not
exercise its discretion to decrease the award.30 The Georgia courts have
been very reluctant either to find a substantive change or to exercise their
discretion to lessen the award. As a consequence of the courts' hesitancy
to find either of these requirements, some odd results have come about in
case law.
In Trippe v. Trippe5 1 the husband, a real estate broker, petitioned the
court for a downward revision. At the time of the original award the husband's income had been $30,000. Out of this income, the husband was
required to pay $1,000 per month in alimony and child support. Three
years later, in 1975, the real estate business had plummeted and the husband's income had decreased to $5,000. The court apparently believed the
presentation of the husband's income figures and noted that there had in
fact been a decrease in income. However, the court held that a decrease in
the alimony obligation was not demanded and upheld the denial of revision by the trial court. The overreluctance of the court to exercise its
discretion in this area can be seen by the absurd result achieved when the
income and alimony figures are carried to their proper mathematical conclusion: the husband had a net income of minus $7,000.32
In contrast, the court has been very amenable to petitions from a former wife for upward revisions based on a change of income or financial
status of the husband. In Butterworth v. Butterworth," the court cited
section 30-221 as the basis of the award. Pursuant to section 30-221, the
court would not discuss the merits of whether the wife was entitled to the
increased award. The only consideration was whether a substantial
change had occurred in the former husband's income or financial status.

29. GA. CODE ANN. § 30-220 (1969) (current version at GA. CODE ANN. § 30-220 (Supp.
1980)).
30. See Knox v. Knox, 225 Ga. 481, 169 S.E.2d 805 (1969); Heidt v. Heidt, 225 Ga. 719,
171 S.E.2d 270 (1969).
31. 237 Ga. 159, 227 S.E.2d 46 (1976).
32. See also Berkowitz v. Berkowitz, 239 Ga. 1, 236 S.E.2d 7 (1977); Barber v. Barber,
233 Ga. 170, 210 S.E.2d 705 (1974); Peace v. Peace, 226 Ga. 571, 176 S.E.2d 51 (1970). The
proper method of determining increase or decrease is based on a comparison of the husband's income at the time of petition with his income at the date of divorce. Knox v. Knox,
225 Ga. 481, 169 S.E.2d 805 (1969); McWilliams v. McWilliams, 216 Ga. 270, 116 S.E.2d 215
(1960).
33. 227 Ga. 301, 180 S.E.2d 549 (1971).
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Based on that rule, the showing of a $5,000 increase3 ' of the husband's
income over a two-year period was considered substantial. Consequently,
the court increased the support payment.36
As opposed to changes in actual monetary income, Georgia courts have
been even less inclined to modify judgments based on changes in financial
status. This has been particularly true when the petition for modification
has been based on increases or decreases due to changes in net worth or
changes in expenses. The court in Gibson v.Giles38 held that a decrease in
net worth caused merely by increased living expenses was not such a
change in financial status as would authorize the jury to reduce the support obligation.
Statutes in existence prior to the 1977 enactment of the "live-in lover"
law clearly gave the former wife the benefit of the law when the husband
petitioned for modification of the alimony award based on a change in his
financial circumstance. The stern judicial interpretation only added to
the wife's benefit. Even if favorably worded modification statutes had
been in existence prior to the "live-in lover" enactment in 1977, judicial
interpretations made it virtually impossible to get a reduction based on
increases in the wife's net worth or decreased expenses. Therefore, given
the statutes and their judicial interpretations, husbands really had no recourse based on a claim alleging a change in the wife's income or financial
status in the absence of a statute similar to the "live-in lover" law which
focused solely on the nature of the relationship of the former wife and
another man.
II.

THE POLICY BEHIND THE STATUTE

The first enactment of a "live-in lover" law occurred in New York in
1938 as the legislative response to the judicial decision in Hayes v.
Hayes.3 7 The court held that the misconduct of the wife involving fornication or an immoral course of living subsequent to a final decree did not
justify annulling the provisions relating to the alimony award. Consequently, the New York state legislature passed the first "live-in lover" act
to specifically allow for modification or annullment in situations covered
by Hayes.8 Various policies and legislative intentions have been sugThe husband's income had increased from $32,650 in 1967 to $37,804 in 1969.
See also Gallant v. Gallant, 223 Ga. 397, 156 S.E.2d 61 (1967).
242 Ga. 720, 251 S.E.2d 231 (1978).
220 N.Y. 596, 115 N.E. 1040 (1917).
N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 248 (McKinney 1977). The statute in pertinent part states:
The court in its discretion upon application of the husband on notice, upon proof
that the wife is habitually living with another man and holding herself out as his
wife, although not married to such man may modify such final judgment and any
orders made with respect thereto by annulling the provisions of such final judg-

34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
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gested as the basis for "live-in lover" laws. However, different policies
have been expressed as courts have focused on the different elements present in the various statutes.
The New York statute required that there be proof that the former
wife is "habitually living with another man and holding herself out as his
wife." '3 9 One widely stated policy supporting the New York statute has
been the elimination of double recovery.40 Along the same line, there has
also been a strong expression of policy against the former wife's use of the
awarded alimony to support a new lover. 41 Accordingly, the courts have
held that it is not consistent to cut alimony at remarriage but yet allow it
to continue when the former wife and her paramour merely live together.
The courts have refused to allow this distinction in the law based on status and title. 4s
However, in Stern v. Stern,'4 another New York court, focusing on the
statutory requirement that the new couple hold themselves out as man
and wife, found that the legislative intent behind section 248 was the
elimination of meretricious relationships approaching marriage. The legislative intent was not to deprive the former wife of alimony because she
was habitually living with another man. Instead, by inserting the "holding
out" clause, the legislature was concerned with the actual content of the
relationship.
Still another New York court in In re Marriage of Anonymous"4 expressed disgust over the operation of section 248. The court stated that
New York's statute encouraged women to "play the field.' 46 The operation of the statute encourages the former wife to find different men for
short periods of time because if she continued to reside with one man she
did so at the risk of losing the support award. The court noted that New
York law had a provision which would lead to the same result based
s
solely on financial need.4
California has also enacted a similar statute, but it has been amended

ments or orders, or both, directing payment of money for the support of such wife.
Id.
39. Id.
40. Leffler v. Leffler, 50 A.D.2d 93, 376 N.Y.S.2d 176 (App. Div. 1975), aff'd, 40 N.Y.2d
1036, 391 N.Y.S.2d 855, 360 N.E.2d 355 (1976).
41. Citron v. Citron, 91 Misc. 2d 725, 398 N.Y.S.2d 624 (Sup. Ct. 1977).
42. In re Marriage of Anonymous, 90 Misc. 2d 801, 395 N.Y.S.2d 1000 (Farn. Ct. 1977).
See also Leffler v. Leffier 50 A.D.2d 1036, 376 N.Y.S.2d 176, 179 (App. Div. 1975) (Nunez, J.,
dissenting).
43. 88 Misc. 2d 860, 389 N.Y.S.2d 265 (Sup. Ct. 1976).
44. 90 Misc. 2d 801, 395 N.Y.S.2d 1000 (Fain. Ct. 1977).
45.

Id. at

46.

N.Y. Dom.

-,

395 N.Y.S.2d at 1006.
REL. LAW

§ 236 (McKinney 1977).
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on several occasions. 7 The original California statute was similar to New
York's and focused on the wife's relationshp with the other man. The
statute spoke in exact terms requiring "proof that the wife is living with
another man and holding herself out as his wife." 4 The 1976 statute, California Civ. Code section 4801.5,'" dealt with subsequent relationships in
terms of "cohabitation" as opposed to "marriage." It also created a rebuttable presumption for the "decreased need of support" when cohabitation
could be shown.
As in New York, California courts have not expressed a single conclusive policy supporting the "live-in lover" law. In In re Marriage of Harris,5 0 the court held that the statute expressed legislative intent to affect
"similar treatment between remarrying spouses" 1 and those "foregoing
the formalities of the marriage contract." '2 Predominantly, however, the
California courts have emphasized the provisions of the statute dealing
with the presumption of decreased need upon cohabitation. 3 California
courts hold that modification will not be granted merely upon the showing of a meretricious relationship. In In re Marriage of Leib," the court
discussed the policy behind section 4801.5. The court first noted the California policy that responsibilities be shared by women as well as men. It
stated that the enactment of section 4801.5 was a constructive step in the
attainment of that goal. Given that alimony is no longer perceived as a
penalty against the husband, the court felt 5it appropriate for such a tenuous obligation to cease upon cohabitation.
Other courts have refused to judicially create "live-in lover" laws. The
47. While there were previous acts, the most relevant now are CAL. Civ. CODE § 4801(c)
(1970) (current version at CAL. CIv. CODE § 4801(c) (West Supp. 1980)), and after amendment in 1976, CAL. CIV. CODE § 4801.5 (West Supp. 1980).
48. CAL. CIv. CODE § 4801(c) (1970) (current version at CAL. CIv. CODE § 4801(c) (West

Supp. 1980)).
CODE § 4801.5 (West Supp. 1980). The statute in pertinent part states:
(a) Except as otherwise agreed to by the parties in writing, there shall be a
rebuttable presumption affecting the burden of proof, of decreased need for support if the supported party is cohabiting with a person of the opposite sex. Upon
such a finding of changed circumstances, the court may modify the payment of
support as provided for in subdivision (a) of section 4801.
(b) Holding oneself out to be the husband or wife of the person with whom one
is cohabiting is not necessary to constitute cohabitation as the term is used in this
section. Id.
50. 65 Cal. App. 3d 143, 134 Cal. Rptr. 891 (Dist. Ct. App. 1976).
51. Id. at 151, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 894.
52. Id.
53. See In re Marriage of Ludwig, 58 Cal. App. 3d 744, 130 Cal. Rptr. 234 (Dist. Ct. App.
1976).
54. 80 Cal. App. 3d 629, 145 Cal. Rptr. 763 (Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
55. Id. at 643, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 771 n. 9.

49.

CAL. Civ.
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Idaho Supreme Court in Daniels v. Daniels,6 noted that the creation of
such a law would in essence give the husband the right to control the
subsequent conduct of the wife. The court held that the failure of the
wife to lead a chaste life did not afford the husband a right to alimony
modification. It further stated: " 'The husband owes a like duty to lead a
moral and virtuous life. If he fails to perform it, could it be contended
that it would give her a right of additional property, or that there should
This
be an increase in her allowance in consequence? Manifestly not.' ,,57
view suggests that the true legislative intent behind "live-in lover" laws
has been to guard and protect the morality of the wife after the divorce.
The wife who engages in meretricious affairs after divorce does so at her
own financial peril. As such, the husband and the courts, through the operation of a "live-in lover" statute, may guard the morality and chastity
of the wife so long as she comes within its purview.
Thus, there are two strands of conflicting policy behind "live-in lover"
statutes: the inequity of double recovery and the inequity of the husband's continued domination of his former wife's affairs. Accordingly, one
policy is financial and one is moral. One view maintains that "live-in
lover" laws advance sexual equality by recognizing the woman's increased
obligations and responsibilities; while the other suggests that the laws allow the ex-wife's activities to continue under the husband's domination
after the marriage is dissolved.
It is impossible to tell which policy the Georgia legislature intended
when it enacted its "live-in lover" law. The Preamble to the Act is ambiguous concerning policy. It states that the law intended "to provide that a
change in the income and financial status of either spouse shall authorize
modification of a judgment for permanent alimony."58 Further, the Preamble states that the act intended "to provide that the voluntary cohabitation of a wife with a man shall be grounds to modify all provisions
made for periodic payments of permanent alimony. '59 However, it is important to note that the law was enacted during the general revision of
Georgia domestic relations and divorce law. The purpose of the revision
was to modernize Georgia divorce law in accordance with modern living
habits and societal principles. From this it may be assumed that the legislature viewed the 1977 "live-in lover" statute as a part of its moderniza-

56. 82 Idaho 201, 351 P.2d 236 (1960).
19, 31 N.E. 109 (1892), and
57. Id. at -, 351 P.2d at 239, quoting Cole v. Cole, 142 Ill.
citing Christiano v. Christiano, 131 Conn. 589, 41 A.2d 779 (1945); Pauley v. Pauley, 280 Ky.
66, 132 S.W.2d 512 (1939); Bowman v. Bowman, 163 Neb. 336, 79 N.W.2d 554 (1956). See
also Alibrando v. Alibrando, 375 A.2d 9 (D.C. Ct. App. 1977); Webb v. Webb, 305 So. 2d 567
(La. App. 1975); Byrd v. Byrd, 478 S.W.2d 45 (Ark. 1972).
58. 1977 Ga. Laws 1253 (emphasis added).
59. Id.
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tion plan. This suggests that the real emphasis of the statute was
financial and aimed at the elimination of double recovery.
Assuming that this is a correct statement of the legislature's policy, it
was a proper and legitimate policy to follow. As part of a modernization
plan, the statute would be focused on the evil of double recovery. It
would not be equitable for a wife to cohabit, receive support from the
paramour, and at the same time continue to receive support from the
former husband. Likewise, if the wife supports the paramour, it would
not be proper for her to do so on the support she receives from her former
husband.
By focusing on the elimination of double recovery, the legislature was
also best able to take into account the variety of conduct possible within
the scope of modern relationships. Given such policy, the parties are able
to exercise the ultimate freedom in the structure of their personal relationships, without fear that specific acts will cause a forfeiture of their
financial interests. Assuming the ex-wife cohabits, the subsequent cohabitation provides her the support previously received under the alimony
judgment. There is no real financial detriment. Likewise, the husband is
not so much concerned with the nature of his ex-wife's relationship as he
is with the reduction of his alimony obligations.6 Focused on double recovery, "live-in lover" statutes allow the husband to get relief without
basing his petition on the meretricious conduct of his former wife or the
content of her new relationship.
The problem with the Georgia statute, however, is that it does not operate in a manner which would enable it to meet the double recovery
problem. The existence of an open, c~ntinuous, and meretricious relationship is a condition precedent to.the statute's operation. While the actual
wording is different, the meaning of the Georgia statute is basically the
same as that of New York's. The use of the words "open and continuous"
in Georgia is analogous to the "holding out" requirement in New York.
Both require public assertions or representations to show the remainder
of society that a relationship equated to marriage exists. The "meretricious" requirement supplies the sexual relationship necessary to show
"holding out as wife." Both statutes require that the court examine the
actual content of the new relationship." Therefore, the court has to look

60. This statement assumes that no children are involved and that the only payment is
in the form of alimony. Given the potential effect a subsequent relationship could have on
children, the character and content of the wife's new relationship take on significance. This
goes not so much to the amount of support, however, as it does to the question of child
custody and control.
61. While it may be argued that the Georgia standard of "open, continuous, and meretricious" may imply a lesser standard than "holding out as man and wife," it cannot be argued
that the statute looks solely at the element of support rather than the content of the
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at the parties' joint activities, the nature of the commitment, and the perception of the relationship by others. These requirements do not focus on
the issues of financial support and double recovery. Consequently, since
the court is looking at the content of the new relationship, the husband
is given the power to assertively affect the wife's post-marital conduct. To
fulfill the policy espoused, the legislature should have created a law allowing the parties total independence, but requiring the wife to relinquish
alimony when support is received from another source. The legislature's
policy was valid, but its method of achievement was inappropriate.
The California statute comes closest to reaching the goal of eliminating
double recovery. The statute on its face creates a rebuttable presumption
that cohabitation implies support for the partners in the relationship.
This creates the presumption of decreased need. However, none of the
statutes found (including California's) deal with the problem totally from
the viewpoint of support. For example, each statute is not operative unless the relationship is between a man and woman. This restriction is express. Consequently in State, ex rel Kenney v. Kenney,6 2 when the husband sought modification due to the wife's subsequent homosexual
relationship, the court held that the statute was clear. The relationship
was not with a man, and therefore, it was unlawful to grant a modification. If each statute focused only on support, the nature of the parties
and the relationship would be of no significance. The only concern would
be whether the wife is receiving support from a party other than her former husband. This concern clearly focuses on the main issue. 3 It gives
the husband a real opportunity for modification; it gives the wife clear
responsibility; and it gives all parties the ultimate freedom of choice in
the arrangement of their personal affairs." '

relationship.
62. 76 Misc. 2d 927, 352 N.Y.S.2d 344 (Sup. Ct. 1974).
63. There is probably only one exception to this general rule. If the wife should decide
on her own to live with and support another person, it is possible that this would reduce her
income and financial status. It would seem improper to allow the wife to then claim that she
was entitled to an increase in her alimony because her new responsibilities have reduced her
income. The wife in this case has voluntarily assumed the responsibility for another person
with full knowledge of the total value of the support payments from her husband. In this
context, she is just like the man who voluntarily remarries and assumes the responsibility
for another family. His obligation to his former wife still exists and is not changed by the
assumption of the new responsibility.
64. It may be contended that this view would force the woman to be subject to a petition
though involved only in a boarding house situation. It is generally stated that the legislatures did not intend application of the "live-in lover" statute to such arrangements. This
argument fails because of the nature of the payment/support involved. Assuming the wife
owns a boarding house, the rent she would receive from boarders (male or female) would not
be in a form so as to substitute for alimony. This income is most similar to a return on
investment. Thus, by legislative intent, the statute would not apply.

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 32

However, it may have been that the Georgia legislature had no real
choice in the wording of its enactment. For reasons previously discussed, 5 the remarriage and modification statutes, due to judicial interpretation, really did not afford any remedy. Prior to 1977, there was no
effective way for a husband to petition the court for modification and
have the court consider the change in the wife's income or financial status
due to a new relationship with another man." Therefore, to reach the
legislative objective, there was no real choice but to draft a law which
focused on the content of the wife's relationship. Ironically, the legislature, in the same act creating the "live-in lover" law, also changed the
statutes dealing with the criteria to be considered on a petition for modification." The legislation creating the "live-in lover" law also amended
subsection (a) of section 30-220. As amended, a petition could show a
change in the income or financial status of either spouse." As rewritten in
1977, section 30-220 could have solved any problem created by past legislation and judicial decision. By being able to show a change in the wife's
income because of her relationship with another man, the husband could
seek modification without going into the content and nature of the new
relationship. To only have enacted subsection (a) would have been the
clearest and best solution. It would also have been the most comprehensible and enforceable.
III.

THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE STATUTE

Until the legislature sees fit to enact another statute, the law will remain as it is in section 30-220. As yet, there has been no judicial interpretation of its requirements. Since that section sets the parameters in which
modification cases will be decided, it is instructive to investigate what
facts will satisfy its requirements and bring the statute into operation.
Again, New York and California cases are most instructive since these
However, if the payments did take this form and did in fact increase the wife's income
and substitute for alimony, then based on the increased income and financial status of the
wife, the statute would apply and the alimony would be reduced. If this did occur and the
legislature maintained that the statute was not intended to cover this situation, then it is
clear that the legislative intent is not looking so much at double recovery but rather the
content of the relationship. Again, this amounts to a prescription of behavior, and only a
relationship similar to the one above would be socially acceptable and survive application of
the "live-in lover" law.
65. See notes 23-35 supra, and accompanying text.
66. GA. CODE ANN. § 30-209 (1969) (Current version at GA. CODE ANN. § 30-209 (Supp.
1980)) and GA. CODE ANN. § 30-220 (1969) (current version at GA. CODE ANN. § 30-220
(Supp. 1980)).
67. 1977 Ga. Laws 1253, 1254 (current version at GA. CODE ANN. § 30-220 (Supp. 1980)).
68.

Id.; GA. CODE ANN. § 30-220(a) (Supp. 1980).
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states have similar statutes. However, the decisions in New York are of
much more benefit given the similarity of the corresponding statutes.
First, it is important to note that the parties may waive the rights they
acquire under the "live-in lover" law. This is both the law in California,
New York, and in Georgia as to the other subsections of section 30-220.
In New York, the court in Hall v. Hall6" noted that if the parties to a
separation agreement waived the right to seek modification a subsequent
action for modification would be barred. The latest Georgia ruling under
other provisions of section 30-220 was the case of Varn v. Varn.10 There,
the court noted that parties to an alimony agreement may obtain modification unless the agreement expressly waives the right to modification by
clearly and expressly referring to the right. The court in Varn stated that
the "clear and express waiver" test would be satisfied by language in the
agreement to the effect that: "The parties hereby waive their statutory
right to future modifications, up or down, of the alimony payments provided for herein based upon a change in the income or financial status of
7
either party." '

This holding eliminated confusion arising from the court's use of the
particular facts present in each case to limit the right of waiver.72 There
seems to be no reason why the court will not expand this permission to
include the allowance of a waiver of subsection (b) of section 30-220-the
"live-in lover" law. This is particularly true if the court determines that
the legislative policy involved is the fear of double recovery. If, however,
the court views the legislative purpose as content oriented with a moral
objective, it may be much less amenable to parties waiving their rights
under a statute prescribing moral conduct.
Concerning the actual statute itself, the first requirement of the "livein lover" law is that there be a "final judgment of divorce awarding periodic payment of alimony. 7' Arguably, a divorce which was based on a
separation agreement which was not incorporated into the decree would
not fall within the statutory requirement. As such, it would not be subject
to the modification provisions of the "live-in lover" law. This provision is
of minor importance when compared to the heart of the statute.
By far, the most important requirement is that there be "voluntary co69. 82 Misc. 2d 814, 372 N.Y.S.2d 344 (Fam. Ct. 1975). See also In re Paul S. & Roberta
S., 91 Misc. 2d 211, 397 N.Y.S.2d 568 (Fan. Ct. 1977); Josephs v. Josephs, 78 Misc. 2d 723,
358 N.Y.S.2d 326 (Sup. Ct. 1974); Rosenberg v. Rosenbberg, 46 Misc. 2d 693, 260 N.Y.S.2d
508 (Sup. Ct. 1965).
70. 242 Ga. 309, 248 S.E.2d 667 (1978).
71. Id. at 311, 248 S.E.2d at 669 n. 1.
72. See Kitfield v. Kitfield, 237 Ga. 184, 227 S.E.2d 9 (1976); McLoughlin v. McLoughlin, 234 Ga. 259, 214 S.E.2d 925 (1975); Garcia v. Garcia, 232 Ga. 869, 209 S.E.2d 201 (1974);
Grizzard v. Grizzard, 224 Ga. 42, 159 S.E.2d 400 (1968).
73. GA. CODE ANN. § 30-220(b) (Supp. 1980).
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habitation . . . in a meretricious relationship. ' 74 Voluntary cohabitation
is defined within the statute as "dwelling together continuously and
'75
openly in a meretricious relationship with a person of the opposite sex."
The New York statute (along with the original California law) spoke only
in terms of a two-part test: habitually living together and holding out as
husband and wife. 76 This two-part test required more than just "living
together."
Two views seem to have been taken in New York. In Northrup v. Northrup7 7 the parties shared bedrooms, cooked meals, did laundry, used the
same car, and shared expenses. The court refused to modify the award
based on the fact that proof of "holding out" was lacking. 78 According to
the court, "holding out" required assertive conduct such as public designation of the couple as husband and wife. The court listed the examples
of applying for a phone with the directory listing in the same last name
and getting a joint checking account in one surname . 7 The court noted
that the statute could be circumvented if the wife could negate any inference that she held herself out as married. The lifestyle of the parties
could not by itself constitute "holding out."80 The dissent in Northrup
noted that the statute would effectively be a dead letter if the formality
required by the majority were the proper interpretation.81 The court in
Levine v. Levine"3 focused on the policy against double support. It also
focused on the technicality of the distinction between women who remarried and those who remained unmarried but lived with another man. The
court seemed to set forth three requirements for the operation of the
"live-in lover" law: continuity, openness, and receipt of support.8
The California decisions are similar. In Double v. Double, 4 the couple
lived together, shared expenses, vacationed together, but had no joint accounts; nor did the wife show the joint apartment as her permanent address. The court found a relationship, but its content was not sufficient to
bring it within the terms of the "live-in lover" law. In contrast, the court
in Lang v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County" found the requisite
74.
75.
76.

Id.
Id.
N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 248 (McKinney 1977). CAL. CIV. CODE § 4801(c) (1970) (current version at CAL. CIv. CODE § 4801 (West Supp. 1980)).
77. 43 N.Y.2d 566, 402 N.Y.S.2d 997, 373 N.E.2d 1221 (1978).
78. Id. at 571, 402 N.Y.S.2d at 999, 373 N.E.2d at 1223.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 572, 402 N.Y.S.2d at 1000, 373 N.E.2d at 1224 (Wachtler, J., dissenting).
82. 79 Misc. 2d 149, 359 N.Y.S.2d 744 (Sup. Ct. 1974).
83. Id. at -, 359 N.Y.S.2d at 745.
84. 248 Cal. App.2d 650, 56 Cal. Rptr. 687 (Dist. Ct. App. 1967).
85. 53 Cal. App. 3d 852, 126 Cal. Rptr. 122 (Dist. Ct. App. 1975).
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showing since the wife received support and she and the paramour shared
a joint checking account and had a telephone listed in only one surname.
Finally, in Thweatt v. Thweatt," the wife was able to show that no husband-wife relationship existed since she had taken in two male boarders
who paid rent. Likewise, there was no evidence of any sexual relationship
or romantic involvement.
The Georgia statute is, of course, couched in different terminology. Arguably, the "open and continuous" requirement is not as strict as "holding out as man and wife." This suggests that fulfillment of the Georgia
standard may not be as burdensome as either the New York or California
statutes. However, this argument is probably erroneous. To be "open" requires that there be some public assertion-like the phone listing or
checking account. "Continuous" and "meretricious" together suggest the
length of time and the sexual activity necessary to establish the existence
of a marriage as well. Consequently, the Georgia standard seems quite
similar to the requirement that the parties "hold themselves out as man
and wife." As a result, the cases under both the New York and California
statutes should be persuasive to the Georgia courts when the opportunity
arises to interpret the Georgia "live-in lover" law.
It is important to note that all three statutes require a determination
and evaluation of the nature of the personal commitment of the partners.
The clearest determinant of the nature of the relationship is the personal
intent and belief of the participants themselves. However, personal intent
and belief are very subjective and consequently extremely hard to prove.
Therefore, proof of a "marital" relationship depends on objective, outward assertions made as representations to the remainder of society. In
essence, these same outward assertions are all indicia of the parties' support to each other. This support has mainly been measured in terms of
objective financial criteria.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The basis of the alimony award is support. The statutes which embody
"live-in lover" laws are an attempt to recognize new societal arrangements by which the wife is able to receive other support in lieu of alimony. The means by which the wife's support may be forthcoming are
numerous and varied. One way is a subsequent relationship with another
party outside of marriage. In determining whether the former spouse is
receiving support from the relationship, it should be unnecessary to explore the innermost content of the relationship. The objective criteria of
financial records should suffice as proof of any change in income or
86.

96 Cal. App. 3d 530, 157 Cal. Rptr. 826 (Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
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financial status as the result of a subsequent relationship. However, the
Georgia statute, by focusing on the nature and content of a relationship
with another person of the opposite sex, in essence allows one spouse to
determine the other's subsequent conduct. Presently, statutes exist which
allow courts to focus on the changes in financial status and income of the
former spouse. Consequently, the "live-in lover" statute as currently written is, in most respects, superfluous and regressive.
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